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INTRODUCTION

"Within the short span of one generation this country has witnessed a transportation revolution."' This growth of the transportation industry and the rapid and
varied innovations in the various transport media have been one of the significant
economic developments in the twentieth century. As the structure of the industry
has changed, it has been necessary to re-evaluate the governmental controls applied
and to examine carefully the economic aspects and competitive relationships of the
several forms of transport.
Much literature in recent years has been devoted to the "transportation problem."
Everyone agrees that there is a problem, but perhaps all would not agree to its exact
nature. Several years ago, in a study of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,2 this writer
wrote that certain proposed revisions would not solve the primary transportation
problem,'
...which is the uncoordinated and excessively competitive operations of transport agencies
subject to diversified regulatory acts, different commissions, and unrelated promotional
policies. Until such time as a coordinated transportation system is organized to function
under integrated regulation, revisions will serve primarily as palliatives.
His thoughts on the problem and attempts to revitalize regulatory policy have remained basically unchanged.
Transport coordination is a problem of long standing, recognized and treated by
numbers of scholars, transport executives, and government officials. The term has,
accordingly, come to have different meanings, or shades of meaning, to different
people. The use of the term ranges from the description of the loosest cooperation
between transport media to the combination of different forms of transport. For
4
purposes of this paper, we shall use the first part of a definition by Peterson :
Co-ordination is the assignment, by whatever means, of each facility to those transport
tasks which it can perform better than other facilities, under conditions which will insure
its fullest development in the place so found.
o Part of the material in this paper is reproduced from Melton, An Integrated Approach to the
Transportation Problem, 23 So. EcoN. J. 398 (1956-57).
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Since the problem of coordination is enmeshed in an environment that is as
political as it is economic, the solutions can seem even more complex than they
actually are. Aside from the effects of political influence and vested interest, there
is the basic philosophy concerning the method to be used. "Coordination of the
services of different transport media can be effected by administrative action. But
it could also be effected-and perhaps with greater economy and efficiency-through
the market processes.: 5
Several solutions for solving the transportation regulatory problems, among them
that of coordination, within the private ownership sphere have been put forth in
recent years. The economic difficulties are, evidently, expected to work themselves
out if the proper regulatory climate and policy are achieved.
Solutions usually revolve around four proposals, or combinations of these proposals. These are (i) consolidation of administration under one regulatory body;
(2) the merger of regulatory and promotional activity; (3) uniformity of regulation
for all transport agencies; and (4)a selective overhaul of the existing pattern, with
a view to placing greater emphasis on competition and less on control. This latter
view is probably best exemplified by the Cabinet Committee's reportY In spite of
the differences in these approaches, all have one characteristic in common: They
assume that the solution will be found within the existing framework of interagency
competition, under some degree of regulatory control.
Competition does offer many apparent advantages to our transportation system.
Most of us are dedicated to a competitive economy. We look with favor upon developments that strengthen the competitive concept and with disfavor upon those
which tend to weaken it. Interagency competition, therefore, fits our basic economic
philosophy.
The various means of transport have progressed rapidly in technological innovations. Much of this can be attributed to the competitive struggle between water, rail,
motor, and air carriers. It may be further asserted that better service has been
instituted and that lower rates have resulted from the competitive relationships of
the several forms of transportation. Certainly pickup and delivery practices of rail
carriers have been stimulated by competition from motor carriers, to name but one
example. Also, there is no denying that commodities and communities which have
a number of transportation alternatives usually enjoy lower rates than those where
competition is absent.
Nevertheless, the writer considers that no adequate, lasting solution will be found
within the competitive framework. It will be suggested that our long-run solution
to the transportation problem may be found not so much in changes in regulatory
practices as in the economic structure of the subject regulated. This is by no means
a new thought, but it has not been much stressed in the past decade until a resurgence
of the view in the past two years. It is proposed that companies utilizing all forms
'nCLAR WiLcox, PuBLic POLICIES TOWARD BUSINmSS 643 (1955).
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of transportation would replace the separate operating types of rail, motor, water,
and air that we have at present. Hereafter, such multimedia firms will be spoken of
as "transportation companies."
The best long-run solution is not necessarily the one that will be adopted; and,
even if it is, ,the length of time required may be inordinately long. For this reason,
the separate agency approach cannot be ignored. At the least, it is vital to the interim
period. At the most, it may be the best solution we can achieve.
In light of the above discussion, this paper will submit two basic proposals for
coordination of the domestic transportation system. The first, and perhaps soundest,
will be predicated on the transportation company. As an alternative, suggestions for
coordinating under the separate transport agency approach will be explored.

I
SoM AREAS OF VARIATION

Because of the American dislike for regulatory activity, the greater part of the
legislation affecting transportation is not the result of careful, long-range planning,
but, rather, a hodge-podge creation based upon expediency and custom. Unfortunately, once custom becomes accepted, it takes on an aura of finality, and revision and
repeal become exceedingly difficult.
Today, transportation is extremely complex. Well-developed common carrier
networks in the rail, water, motor, and air transport fields offer service to most
points in the nation. In addition, there is extensive use of contract, exempt, and
private water and motor carriage, as well as specialized areas of air transport. The
days of the rail monopoly are long gone. All of this has given rise to a multimedia
competitive structure in transportation with which existing regulatory bodies find it
increasingly difficult to cope. Of these many problems, none presents more difficulty
of solution than that of the interagency relationship.
The Interstate Commerce Commission's authority over rate-making has steadily
evolved, until it is well nigh absolute. The Commission may prescribe the maximum,
the minimum, or the exact rate. From the standpoint of current competitive relationships, the power to control minimum rates is the basic ingredient. When authority
over minimum rates was acquired under the Transportation Act of I92o,7 only rail
carriers were concerned. The minimum rate power was exercised primarily to
prevent loss of revenues by carriers, to preserve existing rate structures, and to compel
increases in intrastate rates which burdened interstate commerce. More important
now, because of the increased coverage of the Interstate Commerce Act8 and the
well-developed state of additional modes of transport, is the prevention of destructive
competition and the preservation of all forms of transportation in accordance with
congressional policy.
41 Stat. 484, 49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1952).

824 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1952).
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In addition to its rate-making control, ICC authority over other aspects of the
rail industry is extensive-more so than over any other media-and regulation of
the other forms of transport has increased in scope and intensity. A thorough discussion of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958,' and other applicable legislation lies beyond the scope of this paper. It will
be more pertinent and suffice for our purposes to enumerate some of the more troublesome areas of variation and inconsistency in regulation and promotional activity as
applied to the several carriers. No effort will be made at this point to justify or
condemn such variations.
i.There is no uniformity of regulation. Even the Interstate Commerce Act is
divided into four parts, with varying treatment of the agencies so regulated.
2. One of the most noticeable distinctions between rail and other forms of transport is the recognition of several classes of the latter-i.e., common, contract, private, exempt, and the like. This is a major source of difficulty.
3. There is no single regulatory agency. Further, the regulatory policy is not
coordinated with promotional policy, although each has critical bearing on the
other. The Federal Highway Act of 195610 was a prime example of this. All of
the forms of transport, except rail, currently are the recipients of varying amounts
of public aid in the form of direct or indirect subsidy.
4. The intent of Congress seems to be the compulsion of more competition between the transport agencies, without, at the same time, abandoning regulation designed to preserve individual competitors. In this respect, the problem is somewhat
similar to that encountered in the antitrust field, where the same two objectives
come into conflict.
5.Labor relations have become increasingly troublesome in transportation. Yet,
only the railroads and air lines are subject to legislation specifically aimed at preventing work stoppages in these vital services.
The fundamental difficulties in eliminating these trouble spots and achieving
satisfactory coordination hinge on two issues, the role to be played by interagency
competition and the weight to be given efficient allocation of resources to and
among the various means of transportation.
II
COMPETITION AND RATE-MAKING

The writer has indicated that no adequate solution will be discovered within

the competitive framework. The agency approach to transport regulation, where
the several modes of transport are considered as separate entities, no longer suffices
to cope with current situations. Of the questions faced by federal and state regulatory
bodies-not to mention the carriers themselves-probably the most pressing is that
072 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ x301
etseq. (Supp. 1958).
70 Stat. 388, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4041, 4o61, 4070-73, 4o8i (Supp. V, 1958).
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of competition between the different forms of transportation, each with specific characteristics which give certain cost and service advantages and disadvantages in relation to the others, as well as overlapping features which make advantages and disadvantages less pronounced. Speed and quality of service are of competitive import,
but the major impact must come from the pricing or, in this instance, rate-making.
Two aspects of rate-making present themselves here. The first relates to what
might be called the natural zone of reasonableness, whose upper limit is set by
the highest rate which can be charged without destroying or diverting the traffic, and
whose lower limit is the point below which the carrier would incur costs in excess
of revenue on each unit of the traffic carried. Will carrier management, if unregulated, select a more economically and socially desirable rate than under the
present setup? In other w'ords,. is there sufficient competition in the transportation
industry to depend upon the workings of the market place to establish rates and
fares in such a way that. each. mode of transport will be relegated to its proper sphere
of activity? Competitive rates must, to be effective, be related to the cost of producing the service, and determination of the cost of transporting various items-when
the transportation of such an item is only one of several hundred different services
that can be produced simultaneously by a given plant-is virtually impossible.
In spite of the many factors considered in rate-making, such as value, density,
vulnerability to damage, and. the like, the most important one is probably comparison.
This means that rates are justified by virtue of their relationship to other rates.
But what of the rate selected for this comparison? It, too, was no doubt created
on a comparative basis, or else its origin is more or less untraceable, and it, like
Topsy, just grew. Because of the extreme difficulty of establishing a specific rate on
a cost basis, rate-making might well be considered more of an art than a science.
Value here is not found; it is made on the basis of the presumably reasonable judgment of reasonable men.
The second has to do with what we might call the regulatory zone of reasonableness. Here, the upper and lower limits are subject to Commission edict, and the
higher zone may be less than the consumer would pay if he had to, and the lower
zone may be above that which would be charged by the carrier if unrestrained.
Although the Commission can prescribe the exact rate to be charged, the carrier is
ordinarily free from Commission restraint within the regulatory zone of reasonableness.
In interagency competition,.however, the establishment of the minimum rate is
tantamount to establishment of the actual rate. The crux of the present-day ratemaking controversy, then, lies in this minimum rate factor. Specifically, it concerns
these items.:. (i). Can out-of-pocket costs be determined accurately enough for this
purpose? (2) Is out-of-pocket cost a sound basis'for competitive rate making? and
(3) Can unrestrained competition be.allowed, when related to minimum cost, in an
industry where discriminatory pricing is permissible and prevalent? Cost allocation is a complex proposition for transport firms, because of the multitude of services
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that their machinery is capable of producing. At any given time, such firms will
have a sizable physical plant, capable of producing an indeterminate amount of transportation service. To some extent, the costs of operating the plant are independent
of the quantity of service provided. In addition, there are expenses related directly
to the performance of any specific commodity transportation. The rate charged,
therefore, is a component of two factors: a share of the overhead or common expense
and the. added expense directly incurred by the specific transportation.
From the standpoint of an economic ideal, perhaps, the rates should reflect total
cost, consisting of direct expenses and a fully allocated share of the overhead or
common expense. Actually, this is not always possible. For one thing, it is difficult
to allocate the common costs, for reasons explained previously. For another, it is not
always desirable, from either the standpoint of the carrier or the shipping public,
to levy fully allocated charges. As long as capacity permits, additional traffic that
returns direct cost plus some contributions to overhead, no matter how slight, provides additional revenue to the carrier and, since the over-all revenue is restricted to
a recovery of costs plus a reasonable return on investment, makes possible lower
rates to shippers that do pay fully allocated costs. Such pricing is, of course, discriminatory, but it is permitted on the theory that, so long as the discrimination
is controlled, it is beneficial. On the other hand, the freely competitive use of discriminatory pricing can have adverse effects on rate levels and on traffic that is noncompetitive.
It must be clearly kept in mind, then, that minimum rates are often discriminatory
and that lowest out-of-pocket cost does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the
lowest average total cost. Suppose an item can be transported by either of two modes
of transportation. Carrier A would need to charge one dollar to recover total cost,

consisting of fifty cents overhead and fifty cents direct expense. Carrier B, on the
other hand, would need to charge ninety cents to recover full cost, consisting of thirty
cents overhead and sixty cents direct cost. In a competitive situation, if rates were
permitted to gravitate toward out-of-pocket costs, Carrier A would have the advantage, although it is actually the high-cost carrier when all factors are considered.
From the standpoint of sound, economical use of natural resources, another view
of the above example deserves consideration in order to reflect certain other factors
of vital consequence. The economical carriage of one commodity or a few commodities must be balanced against the efficient carriage of many commodities. Troxel
writes :1
A pipeline, taken alone, can often haul oil or gasoline more cheaply than can a railway
line. But railways are still required for other commodity movements, and even some oil
movements along the same paths. Or motor trucks can carry some commodities at lower
costs and, on occasion, offer higher qualities of transport service than railways; but the
railway technique remains for other traffic. These and other situations of partial substitution cannot be controlled to efficient transport ends, measured in the aggregate, if each
"'
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technique is treated as a separate or a special case. No matter what their popularity, cost
comparisons between techniques are not enough.
This situation must be accorded attention in any formulation of national transportation policy.
Discriminatory pricing is an accepted American institution. Impossible under

conditions of perfect competition and lamented by many economists, discriminatory
pricing policies are an integral part of the marketing philosophy of many business

firms. Product differentiation, based on different trade labels representing various
degrees of quality which exist to a considerable extent only in the minds of advertising
agencies and a gullible public, is the outstanding example. The buyer usually has
several sources from which to choose, however, and these sources enjoy no privileged
status in the eyes of public authority.
This is very definitely not the case in the purchase of transportation from a
common carrier. There may be no satisfactory substitute, nor, under controlled
entry, may there be the possibility of any development of a substitute. The buyer is

paying a discriminatory price not through choice or lack of knowledge, but through
necessity. One may take the view, of course, that there is nothing particularly
onerous or reprehensible about value-of-service pricing so long as competitive conditions exist and that, since the establishment of several well-developed media of
transport, competitive conditions actually do exist.

To evaluate the validity of the last-mentioned position, it is necessary briefly to
examine a concept of workable competition. Except for use as a model, the idea
of perfect competition, with its requisites of homogeneous product, many buyers
and sellers, mobility of resources, and knowledge of the market place, plays little
part in modern economic analysis. The majority of economists feel satisfied if there
are enough buyers and sellers, together with some opportunity for entry and withdrawal, to assure reasonably dynamic allocations. To function satisfactorily, competitive conditions of this sort should effect, in so far as the transportation system
is concerned, the following achievements: (i) allocate resources between transportation and other industries; (2) allocate transportation resources among the various
media; and (3) allocate the services of each transport medium in the most effective
way.
Concerning the first point, such allocations in our economy are not fully effected
by competitive forces. In the absence of government financial assistance, which, by
and large, has been no greater to transportation than to several other segments of
the economy, the transportation firms would have had to attract capital on the same
basis as anyone else. But it must be remembered that the subsidy element in air,
water, and highway transportation causes some distortion. This complex subject lies
beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to say that competition is not the sole
basis for the fundamental allocation of resources between transportation and other
economic activity.
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The allocation of resources among the media of transport and among firms within
a given media is not completely dependent upon competitive conditions, either. Let
us assume that a nontransportation firm finds that its scale of operations is too small
for effective production. It may, subject to its financial limitations, expand its
operation and sell over a wider area. A common carrier does not find this so easy
to do, because its territorial operating rights are definitive and permission to expand
may not be forthcoming from appropriate regulatory bodies. Or suppose useful
techniques are developed by a nontransportation firm's competitors-techniques,
perhaps, that partially or completely outdate existing methods. Again, the firm would
adopt the improvements as rapidly as possible. But transportation firms are rather
rigidly delineated, and common carriers of a given mode of transport are prevented
from branching into other forms of transportation.
The efficacy of the individual carrier is not allowed to resolve itself under competitive conditions with others of its own kind. Common carrier rates between points
served by competing lines are ordinarily published by conferences or bureaus. Although the individual carriers may abstain from such tariffs, as a practical matter,
this is not feasible, so weak roads may get such business as readily as strong ones,
and circuitous routes may be used as frequently as direct ones; for in either case, the
rate is the same. Nor is the rate necessarily geared to the cost of the most efficient
carrier. It may, and frequently does, reflect averaging or umbrella rate-making not
because it is forced by the regulatory commission, but because it is the wish of the
carrier group. Further, controlled entry protects, to a considerable extent, the vested
interests of a given form of transportation. Certainly, transport firms need not fear
the unrestricted onslaught sometimes encountered outside the field.
It is apparent that conditions prerequisite for effective competition are now lacking in transportation. This does not, however, necessarily indicate that conditions
required for competition cannot be achieved if regulation were abandoned.
What results can be expected from competitive pricing among these agencies?
The managerial prerogatives, whose infringement is so often lamented, would be
restored; but as a group device, because of the aforementioned bureaus. As far as.
cost determination is concerned, the situation would remain unchanged, except
the allocation might conceivably be closely related to the demand for an alternate
service provided by competing carriers. The most hoped-for accomplishment is that
a more rational allocation of transportation resources would result.
The writer has serious doubts about the certainty of this occurrence. First of all,
there cannot be effective competition in conjunction with regulation. The terms are
in themselves contradictory. So long as firms are not free to enter and leave an industry at will, to expand whenever the management deems it necessary, or to imitate
the methods and devices of more successful rivals, a " competitive" rate cannot be
relied upon as an economic rationing device. Further, the fixing of prices and
control of earnings by public authority, if followed consistently, will, for obvious.
reasons, undermine a competitive structure.
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It is interesting to note that few of the advocates of competition as the prime
allocator in transportation have ever suggested that regulation be abandoned. A

minimum of regulation is always tolerated to prevent the rise of "destructive"
competition. It is suggested by this writer that competition seldom, if ever, destroys
anything but individual competitors, and, if the underlying conditions for effective
competition are present, this should accrue to the benefit of the system. On the
other hand, if the conditions requisite for effective competition are not present, as
in the utility field, the results will likely not be beneficial. Perhaps there is still
something of the utility complex in transportation, in spite of what the Cabinet
Committee calls the growth of "pervasive competition."" The reluctance of transport executives to give up regulation would seem to underline some lack of faith
on their part as to the effectiveness of competition.
If regulated competition should be abandoned and competition relied upon completely, the result would be the end of the common carrier, for the common carrier
isnot basically competitive by nature. These carriers would not be able to withstand
the diversion of the more desirable traffic to the noncommon carriers. It is doubtful
if the economy is ready to abandon its system of public carriage, for the link between
the common carrier and the common welfare is still a strong factor with which to
reckon.
Of the alternatives to the existing method of handling interagency competition,
greater reliance upon competitive rate-making is a delusion. There can be no effective competition under regulation; and, in the absence of regulation, the transport
system would be demoralized. All of this suggests, then, that the integrated transport
firm-the transportation company-may be a more satisfactory and lasting solution.
III
TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES

These transportation companies have definite strengths that might eliminate or
mitigate certain of the existing problems in transportation. The use of these companies would remove the interagency conflicts that currently plague the carriers.
At least this would be true of the existing conflicts between common carriers. Unless contract, private, and exempt carriage are defined and regulated in such a way as
to prevent many of the abuses associated with -such transportation, a key trouble
spot would remain. Nevertheless, the elimination of interagency rivalry between the
common carriers would remove one of the major obstacles to a solution of transport
coordination.
The transportation company is an agency in which coordinated transport service
can be effectively accomplished. The management of such companies should be in a
position to select the means of transport best suited, from the standpoint of service
and economy, for the various operating and demand situations encountered.
" PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
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The transportation company provides a means of achieving more efficient use of
transportation resources. There are two possible ways in which the increased
efficiency might materialize. One is the elimination of the waste and duplication
that comes from the existence of a number of competing media. The coordinated
effort of the integrated company should permit the abandonment of facilities whose
function could be more effectively performed by some other medium or combination
of media. A second saving might come through the operations of economy of scalethe substitution of large-scale firms for a multitude of small ones. It has long been
contended that expanded size of a transportation firm would bring about substantial
decreases in unit costs. Today, there is some question as to the extent such economies
are actually realized. Koontz found that the route structure and density of traffic
were of far greater importance than the size of the firm.'3 Roberts reached much
the same conclusion in a recent study of motor carrier costs.' 4 A comparison of
financial and operating statistics of various size rail carriers indicates some possibility
that this is also true of railroads.
The fact that such economies may not be as great within each medium as once
thought does not preclude such economies from the integrated firm, but mere size
alone is not necessarily the most important characteristic of the transportation company. Rather it is the ability to eliminate duplication and to exploit a coordinated
transportation system.
The transportation company is not, however, without its weaknesses. There
is the possibility of suppression of other media of transport by the dominating agency
in the organization. The most often-voiced fear, when coordination or combination
of the several modes of transport is mentioned, is that such an organization would
be rail-dominated. The possibility of domination of one type by another is admitted. If permitted to occur, it would be a deterrent to the hoped-for result. It
does seem unlikely, however, that such a bias could be successively passed to subsequent managerial groups over a period of time. 5
Similarly, many voice the fear of complacency of the management of such transportation companies. With the element of competition removed, what incentive will
those who operate the enterprise have to increase their efficiency of operations, either
through better utilization of a given technology or through the introduction of
technical innovations? The question of incentive is a pressing one. A limited
amount of competition between transportation companies might be permitted, and
some stimulus might come from private carriage. A more direct monetary stimulant
might be provided through the adoption of some sort of sliding-scale basis for rate
control, under which earnings in excess of what is considered an adequate rate would
be shared by both shippers and management.
Air Line sell-SufDciency, 42 Am. EcoN. Rzv. 103 (1952).
"4Roberti, Some Aspects of Motor Carrier Costs: Firm Size, Eidency, and FinancialHealth, 32 LAND
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Also in the nature of a weakness, or perhaps better described as a stumbling
block to creation, is the difficulty of formation. The antagonism of the management
.of the various transport media would make voluntary establishment on a cooperative
basis most difficult to accomplish. Motor, water, and air carriers would fear domination by rail management, and logically so. A large rail system would bring the
greater amount of assets and tonnage into a transportation company and would expect
this contribution to be reflected in the apportionment of equity. Nor would compulsion by governmental authority be palatable to either the transport firms or the
majority of the general public, even in the unlikely event such legislation should
escape the condemnation of the courts.
Under what conditions, then, could transportation companies conceivably be
established? One possible arrangement would be the purchase of control of the
needed media by an outside corporation formed for the purpose, with subsequent
merger under new management. Such an event would require a change in both
transport regulation and antitrust law, but this way does alleviate fears of control
by any one form of transport.
A second way lies in removing the restrictions on the utilization of one form of
transport by another medium-for instance, the operation of a motor carrier by a
railroad. Such restrictions affect rail carriers primarily, for few motor, air, or water
lines are in a position to institute rail service. The removal of these limitations
would mean that rail carriers would be free to form transportation companies.
Still another possibility is the acceleration of consolidation of like means of transport.
These firms might then be more easily merged into transportation companies.
If transportation companies were formed, what should be the ultimate climate
for their operations-conditions of controlled competition, or exclusive territorial
operating rights? If the first condition prevailed, there would undoubtedly be some
conflict between regulation and the competitive urge; but effective regulation should
be more easily achieved than at the present time, because of the structural homogeneity of the firms involved. The latter course would mean a sharp break with
existing regulatory policy.
It is not easy for an economist of orthodox training to advocate controlled monopoly or near monoply. Still, this appears to be the inevitable solution to the formation of an economic and coordinated transportation system, and the writer proposes
that the transportation companies operate under these conditions. They would, in
effect, be treated as a public utility. The change is not so marked as it might appear
at first glance. Common costs would continue to be allocated on a demand basis,
and rates would still be related to value of service as long as such value was above
out-of-pocket cost. Earnings control would keep the general rate level within reasonable bounds, and the Commission power over individual rates would care for specific
instances of unreasonable or discriminatory charges. The only thing missing under
the regional monopoly would be the fiction of allocation by interagency competition.
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If some reliance on competition is insisted upon, then the transportation companies could be granted overlapping territories, as were the rail carriers. The ensuing activities in the competitive areas would have to be regulated in much the
same fashion as the rail carriers before the advent of effective motor transportation,
with many of the difficulties attendant to that era and the present.
If the transportation company could be successfully operated, most of the so-called
coordination problems that exist at present would be eliminated, and control of those
that remained would be simplified. Specifically, any justification that might now
exist for separate commissions and regulatory provisions would be removed. The
interagency competition between common carriers would disappear with the separate
corporate entities. It might be too much to expect that the transportation company
would be any less disposed to accept public aids than the individually subsidized
modes, but since such aids would no longer be critical as a competitive factor, it
would perhaps be easier to approach promotional policy with better perspective.

IV
PIECEMEAL APPROACHES

Even if we assume that the transportation company will prove to be the most
satisfactory long-run solution to the problem of transport coordination, there is no
evidence that the public, government, or the transport firms are anxious to accept
it. Such support as is evidenced at the present time comes principally from railroad
groups and interests, but it may be that the rail carriers have become interested
in the acquisition of competing forms some twenty-five years too late. It is well to
remember, also, that the public is not always interested in the maximum in efficiency.
They may value competition among transport firms as a principle, even if there
is added cost involved. They may insist on promoting certain types of transportation, regardless of the economic justification for such action.
If the transportation company is to be a long time in coming, with more than a
remote possibility that it may not come at all, what measure of coordination may be
achieved in the face of the separate agency approach? What may be expected depends on (I) whether a piecemeal or positive approach to policy revisions is followed; (2) the public attitude toward the equitable treatment of transportation costs
-i.e, the question of public aids; and (3) the amount of competition relative to
regulation.
In 1954, the President established the Presidential Advisory Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, requesting that it undertake a comprehensive review
of over-all federal transportation policies and problems and submit recommendations
for the consideration of the President and Congress. The findings of this Cabinet
Committee, while touching on several of the trouble spots of transport legislation and
while purporting to be positive in nature, are representative of the piecemeal approach
to policy revision. The Cabinet Committee, in its appraisal of national transporta-

634

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

tion policy, proceeded from the fundamental premises that the transportation system
operates in a general atmosphere of pervasive competition, that adjustment of the
regulatory programs and policies to these competitive forces were long overdue, and
that restoration and maintenance of a progressive and financially strong system of
common carrier transportation is of paramount importance to the public interest.
To accomplish these ends, the Cabinet Committee suggested a number of revisions in
public policy.' 6
First, and most emphasized, was increased reliance upon competitive forces in
rate-making. Competition was to be stimulated by (i) limiting the regulatory
authority of the ICC in rate control to the determination of reasonable minimum and
maximum rates; (2) restricting the duration of the time period for which the Commission has the power to suspend rates; (3) removing the requirement that rail or
water common carriers obtain prior approval for fourth-section relief where necessary to meet competition and when the charge is not less than a reasonable rate; and
(4) legalizing volume freight rates when based upon cost differences and when
established to meet competition.
The other recommendations of the Cabinet Committee called for a stricter definition of private and contract carriage; the requirement that contract carriers publish
actual rather than minimum charges; the repeal of the bulk-commodity exemption
applicable to water carriers, so that such transportation might be subjected to regulation similar to that applicable to other transportation; the tightening of standards for
qualification as a nonprofit association for exemption from regulation as a freight
forwarder; empowering the Commission to override certain state service requirements
if continuance of such service would unduly burden interstate and foreign commerce,
provided adequate substitute service were available; and the clarification of agricultural commodity exemptions.
If one assumes that the Cabinet Committee's emphasis on increased reliance on
competitive forces in rate-making was proper, a serious omission in its report was
the failure to provide the basis for such competition. Competition is effective only
when competitors are placed on an equal footing, and no efforts were directed toward
this fundamental end. Specifically, there should have been exploration of the
question of public aids and the possibility of user charges to reflect these benefits;
and the area of uniform regulation should have been examined with some care.
In the ensuing-years, a good part of the principal recommendations of the Cabinet
Committee have been enacted into law. The result, however, has not been any great
feeling that transportation problems are solved or are even in the process of being
solved. - "
The Cabinet Committee made no direct mention of air transport, even though it
is a dynamic and rapidly growing form. The last session of Congress revised the
regulation applied to air carriers with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, although the economic regulation was left virtually unchanged.
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It is imperative that the improvement of future transportation policy should
include promotional activity-that is, the planning, financing, and construction of
transport facilities-as well as regulation. The two are inseparable; but so far, legislation respecting the economic regulation of the carriers has ignored the factor of promotion, and vice versa.
No comprehensive plan for the promotion of the several forms of transportation
currently exists. The agencies are considered separately, without regard to the impact on the total transport network. If regulatory and promotional activity are to
remain in separate hands, some means must be found for coordinating the two.
Without this, the effectiveness of efforts to coordinate the transport system under
the separate-agency approach will be limited. It may well be that the public will
choose to continue to promote certain spheres of transportation through the direct
or indirect grant of public aids, but the consequences of this for the nonsupported
or inequitably supported agency will be of the negative type, and competition will
have to be carefully watched and controlled in the interest of maintenance of effective
transportation.
As mentioned previously, no serious consideration has been given by either the
management of transport firms or by the Government to the abandonment of restraints on competition, in spite of the talk about the pervasiveness of such restraints.
The question is, then, how much can regulation be relaxed and how much competition can be substituted for control? Unless the public and transport management are willing to pay the short-run costs to obtain the expected long-run benefits
of competitive transportation, the answer is, not very much. There is no evidence
that transport firms wish to engage in such competition, except on their own terms.
Some years ago, Dr. John Ise, then of the University of Kansas, spoke at a dinner
sponsored by the College of Commerce of Louisiana State University. One of his
comments was to the effect that those who speak loudest about promoting competition will bear the closest watching. The thought is still appropriate! It is doubtful
that we shall get enough competition to rely on it to allocate transportation resources.
It is possible that we shall get enough to make the allocation on other bases more
difficult.
Even if competition under unified and comparable regulation is the course
adopted, there remains the question of the form the competition should take. There
are two clearly distinct types that operate concurrently. One is the intra-agency
competition between like forms, such as railroads, and the other is the interagency
competition between different kinds of transport, such as rail and motor. Is it
necessary to have railroads compete with railroads and motor carriers with motor
carriers, or will competition between different forms suffice? If interagency competon is deemed sufficient, regulatory policy and practice might be revised to permit,
and even encourage, the consolidation of like agencies into fewer and more economical units. The writer feels that the increased integration of similar forms of
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transport will be necessary, no matter what the ultimate climate of transport operation.

V
PUBLIC AIDS AND PROMOTION

While the probability of getting an optimum of coordination without an optimum
of integration is somewhat remote, this does not mean that the transport network
cannot be more effectively coordinated than it is at present. The fact that we have
failed to achieve it so far is the result of our dislike for disturbing established economic patterns. "America needs all forms of transportation" is sometimes used as a
slogan by transportation groups. This is no doubt true; but it does not necessarily
follow that we do not need more of some and less of others than formerly. If such
groups had been well enough organized in the days of the Conestoga wagon, it might
be with us yet. It is time to allocate our transportation resources on a more economical basis. If we insist on doing otherwise, at least we must not be disappointed
with our efforts to obtain optimum coordination of transportation facilities.
Coordination within the general pattern of the existing framework calls for a
number of fundamental changes in law and attitude, in conjunction with numerous
minor revisions. Basic to any program of coordination is uniformity of regulation,
or as much uniformity as the nature of the media will permit. It goes without saying
that much more is permissible than is indicated by regulation now in effect. Basic
to uniformity of regulation, however, is equitable promotional policy, and we shall
begin our discussion around this focal point.
The transportation firms, whatever the media, have as an underlying basis for
rate-making the concept of discriminatory pricing. They make no pretense of consistently treating economic comparables alike. It is good business from their standpoint, and the strengthened transportation system which results is said to benefit all.
The public, too, in its policy toward transport firms follows a policy of discrimination. This discrimination also is probably capable of strengthening the transportation system, although it may not benefit all firms engaged in the business. But this
type of discrimination, like discriminatory rates, may become undue or excessive,
with the effect that it is more harmful than helpful.
It is unlikely that the public will soon give up its inclination to promote certain
categories of transportation, especially the newer forms or those that serve wellorganized groups. It is imperative, however, that these public aids be clearly isolated
by amount and recipient, so that the hidden cost of transportation may become a
matter of public knowledge. It is further necessary that the projects calling for
public aid be coordinated, with a view to economy of effort and maximization of
transportation facilities.
From a purely economic standpoint, all transportation should pay its own way.
Where it is not feasible or economic for the transport firm to provide certain of its
own facilities and the public authority must do so, the cost of the investment so

TRANSPORT COORDINATION

provided should be recovered through the imposition of user charges. The public,
in a democratic society, may demand certain transportation services that are not,
for one reason or another, capable of pricing at rates that would attract usage. In
other words, the public may desire transportation for which it is not willing to pay
the full cost as a direct corollary to the use of the service. The deficit is expected to be
made up from the general revenues of the government. This subsidization of transport is especially prevalent with respect to new developments in transportation.
Every form of transport has, at one time or another, been the recipient of varying
amounts of public aid in its period of early development, and some have received
payments into maturity. No transport concern, and no user group, ever voluntarily
relinquishes such public assistance; but the economic use of resources requires
that the need of transport forms for publicly-provided facilities and their ability to
contribute a part or all of such costs in user payments be continually appraised, for
unwise subsidization is a major factor in diversion of traffic from common carriers.
Either subsidies must be kept to a minimum, or consideration must be given to the
subsidization of the entire system, including the railroads. Accordingly, it is suggested that the several governmental agencies now actively promoting the different
forms of transportation should be combined into a single entity. Whether this agency
should be combined in a single department which would also function in the
regulatory field or be maintained as a separate division will be treated below; but,
whatever its location, this department should be invested with the authority and
responsibility for planning the development of the entire transport system. It is
further suggested that careful analysis by this agency of the benefits to a balanced
program of transportation should be made prior to the construction of facilities,
and that consideration should be given to the development of a system of user
charges where they do not now apply.
VI
UNIFICATION OF REGULATION

Comparable footing is mandatory for competition between carriers, and comparable treatment is, for that matter, desirable in its own right. The various segments of American transportation had their inception at different times, and this,
coupled with the American custom of regulating as the need presents itself, has
resulted in separate acts to regulate separate industries. As the segments become
more fully developed, the varying treatment accorded the different media becomes
less satisfactory. The time has come-indeed, it has long passed-to replace the diverse provisions with a more homogeneous application.
While much unification of treatment might be accomplished under the separate
regulatory bodies now authorized, unified regulation requires unified control. An
appropriate start to coordinated regulation would be the creation of a single agency
of control. It might be objected that the single body would not have the high degree
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of interest in any one medium of transport that the present boards have, but this
is precisely the point. The degree of objectivity would be increased, and this is desirable. The ability of a single body to acquire the vast amount of knowledge required to administer all forms of transportation might also be questioned. The
details of the operation of any one of the agencies are beyond the ken of any one
individual, true, but the mastery of the principles of transportation and the general
information required to comprehend the problems of the several forms of transportation is a less formidable task. The single regulatory agency will provide the base
for an unprejudiced view of the over-all concept of transport which can be obtained
in no other way.
Reference has already been made to the need for centralizing promotional policy
and coordinating it, to some extent, with regulatory objectives. The Hoover Commission advanced a solution which would concentrate all general research and promotional activities under the direction and control of a governmental agency concerned with all of the major questions of transportation policy, and would retain
separate commissions to perform the essentially regulatory functions.1 7 Under such
a system, the promotional agency would, in general, determine which promotional
programs were necessary and justifiable. Consideration might be given to lodging
with such an agency the determination of the over-all extent of the direct subsidy
programs. If this were done, the regulatory commissions, as far as subsidies are
concerned, would be restricted to determination of which parties should receive particular subsidies.
The multiregulatory-body approach would be rejected by this writer, but the
other feature of the Hoover Commission's recommendation is worthy of consideration. The Commission was also on sound footing when it rejected the idea of a
separate Department of Transportation. Its thought was that this might lead to the
demand for departments for other major industries.
What are the ramifications of housing responsibility for major questions of transportation policy, including promotion, in a division of transportation and establishing
a separate regulatory commission to function independently? Such a step means,
first, that a comprehensive, but not inflexible, plan for transportation use and development may be formulated. This, in turn, means that competition is not to be relied
upon as the prime allocator of resources to transportation; but competition has never
been relied upon to the exclusion of other forces where transportation and public
utilities have been concerned. The over-all plan will not preclude an aggressive effort
by the management of the several media, in groups or alone, for increased efficiency
and expanded markets, both for the firm and the industry. Second, the centralization
of promotional policy means that a concise, coordinated program of public aids can
be formulated and controlled, and the costs more accurately evaluated, ascertained,
and apportioned-if this is felt desirable-to the proper beneficiaries. This means
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that the regulatory body, to a greater extent than at present, will be informed and
aware of the extent and place of public aids in interagency conflicts and competition.
Mention is made above of the preference for an independent regulatory body.
The fundamental basis on which this choice is predicated is the desire to preserve the
impartiality of the commission, and to do this, the commission must be as free as
possible from political interference from either administration or congressional
sources. Even the so-called independent body can be subjected to political influences
by the passage of unwise legislation or amendments to force action that the commission could not otherwise undertake in good conscience-the amendment of the Motor
Carrier Act with respect to trip-leasing was a prime example of this'--but at least
the activity is overt.
Unification of regulatory activity will not, in itself, insure comparable treatment
and supervision of the several media of transportation, although it should lead in that
direction. The acts themselves, and the parts thereof, must be aligned, in so far as
the economic characteristics of the transport types will permit. This permits a considerable amount of flexibility in the revision, but it is anticipated that it will result
in a minimum amount of inconsistency. Whether the emphasis is placed upon a
maximum of competition with a minimum of regulation or a maximum of regulation
with a minimum of competition, incomparable treatment of the separate modes of
transport is indefensible.
VII
SOIE IMMEDIATE STEPS

If the public and the government are not ready to accept a positive approach to the
transport problem, either in the form of transportation companies or through comparable treatment of the separate agencies, a great deal of coordination is still possible
under existing conditions. Slight changes in legislation could make possible still
more. These potential areas of coordination are important not only because they
may be effected, to some degree, in a short time period, but because such coordination
would be required under more permanent solutions and is, therefore, a step in that
direction. The coordination is of two types, intra-agency and interagency.

The railroads have developed intra-agency coordination to a higher degree than
any of the other forms of transport. It is to them that we might first look as a model
(not necessarily an ideal one) of what might be attained in the way of coordinated
service involving a single medium of transportation. Over a long period of time,
as a result of managerial decision and commission prodding, the railroads have
developed an extensive network of through routes, established joint rates, evolved
comprehensive car service rules for the interchange of equipment, and provided for
joint use of terminals. The rails have also provided for the interchange of freight
with water carriers and, in some instances, with other types of carriage. In the
areas of through routes, joint rates, and interchange of equipment, the other carriers
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have lagged noticeably behind the rail carriers. Much of the delay has been caused
by the size of operations of the carriers and the characteristics of the equipment used.
A small or medium-sized trucker cannot afford to release a loaded trailer to another firm with the knowledge that he will be without its service for days or weeks,
for it would handicap his ability to provide service over his own route. This inability
to exchange trailers has been one of the major factors in retarding the development
of coordinated motor carriage. The increasing use of leasing companies and the increased supply of equipment which this makes available will help to remedy this
situation. In the latter part of 1958, 365 common carriers by motor vehicle formed
the National Motor Equipment Interchange Committee to facilitate the increased
interchange of motor trailer containers.
One factor that should have considerable impact on the ability of carriers to offer
coordinated service is the increasing amount of consolidation proposed for motor
carriers and for rail carriers. The barriers that impede the development of transportation companies do not exist in the same magnitude with respect to integration of like forms of transport.
Any economic coordination of transportation is desirable, and coordination of the
services of like forms of transport is to be fostered; but it is still necessary that the
transport system as a whole be more coordinated than at present, whether the
coordination be a joint effort of the separate media or the decision of a company
controlling more than one medium. Several examples of the coordination of separate media as a joint effort currently exist. One of these is the movement of air
express, which is a joint venture of the airlines and railway express. Another is plan
I piggyback-rail transportation of trailers owned by common motor carriers-which
is one form of coordinating rail and motor service that is growing in popularity.
Piggyback, of which plan I is only one of several methods for coordinating railmotor service by use of trailers on flat cars, is one of the most promising devices to
coordinate the economic advantages of the flexibility of motor carriers with the overthe-road economy of rail. Improvements in the physical equipment used in the
service, such as the flexi-van, plus the increased use of incentive rates to put more
common motor carrier trailers on the rails, should bring accelerated usage. More
experimentation is in order with respect to joint rates between rail and motor carriers,
which would serve, in effect, to extend the territory of each carrier into that served
by the other. A number of such agreements are already in effect.
Broader in scope is the present request of the Western States Movers' Conference for permission to admit rail and water carriers, which will join rates and
through routes.' 9 Much potential coordination of this sort has been hindered in the
past by the fear by one carrier of strengthening another. There is some evidence
that the desire for mutual profit is overcoming this misgiving.
An important development that may speed coordinated handling of freight between the several forms of transport.is the advance made in the use of large-size
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containers, of which the truck trailer itself is one type-the most mobile type. With
piggyback and fishyback, these containers may be exchanged readily between motor,
rail, and water-and possibly air freight. In fact, this must be considered the most
promising of all devices to promote physical coordination of the separate agencies.
Under existing regulation and philosophy, then, the very minimum in coordination
of transportation calls for (i) continuing consolidation of like forms of transport;
(2) increasing the number of through routes and joint rates requiring participation of
unlike forms of transport, such as rail and motor, or motor and water, as well as
increasing the number of through and joint routes of like forms of transportation;
and (3) the interchange of equipment wherever possible to facilitate the service and
economy of joint routes.
CONCLUSION

Coordination of transportation can range from a high degree of integration to a

loose type of cooperation. The ultimate in coordination comes under the former
circumstance. How much coordination can be expected depends upon the desire
of the American public for coordinated transport relative to their desire to preserve
separate, competing transport entities subject to varying degrees of regulation and
public assistance. It is suggested, therefore, that there are several answers to the
problem of transport coordination, depending upon the fundamentals of public
policy toward the transportation system.
It is evident that the existing regulation is unsatisfactory in many respects. It
is also apparent that the transportation system is not achieving its maximum economic
potential. Expressions from industry and from congressional leaders indicate that the
need for remedial action is recognized. This action has manifested itself in revision
of the Interstate Commerce Act and the passage of the Federal Aviation Act, and
further revision is indicated. As a minimum, we may expect a continuing patching
of some of the most obviously inadequate or outdated provisions. As a maximum,
greater reliance may be placed on competition, with a change in regulatory and
promotional policy to effect it. Neither policy will provide a completely workable
answer because of the nature of the transportation industry. The industry's characteristics will not permit more than a minimum amount of competition without
undesirable aftereffects. On the other hand, regulatory control is made difficult by
the heterogeneity of the carriers subject to jurisdiction.
The ultimate solution may lie in a change in the economic structure of the
firms offering transportation service, which will eliminate interagency competition
and provide a base for uniformity of regulation. A change of this sort would be
most difficult to effect. Still, the transportation company has much to offer from
a regulatory and economic standpoint. Further thought might well be given to
the transportation company as a long-run solution to the transportation problem.
An intermediate solution may take either of two approaches, competitive or regulatory. Each would be predicated upon two premises. First, there would be corn-
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parable treatment of public aids for all forms of transport. Either user charges
would be assessed on those receiving public aids or public aids would be extended
to those currently not receiving any. Promotional policy would be comparable
in any event and closely coordinated with the regulatory function. Second, the inconsistencies in the regulation of the several modes of transport would be removed,
and uniform control would be exercised by a single, independent regulatory authority.
These intermediate approaches would differ in that one would place major emphasis
on competition as an allocator of resources among the several media of transportation;
this would mean that the preservation of the individual competitors would be placed
secondary to the maintenance of a vigorous competition between firms. The alternate
intermediate solution would be based on the assumption that reliance on greater
competition for transport allocation is unworkable because of the nature of the
industry; competition would be permitted, but there would be no hesitancy about
moderating it by regulatory action in both general and specific cases.
The least desirable, but most easily attained, solution is a continuation of existing
laws, commissions, and policy, with only such amendment of particular areas as will
be forced when the areas become troublesome or when there are shifts in attitude
toward specific problems. Even within this framework, a great deal of coordination
can and should be effected, on both an interagency and an intra-agency basis. Extension of through routes, joint rates, the interchange of equipment, and expedition of
service should be promoted and encouraged, for they are beneficial to the transport
firms directly concerned, to the shipping public, and to the maintenance of a vigorous
transportation system.

